Comparative Political Studies recent issues

Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

Golder, S. N. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences, surprisingly little is known about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions. In this article, the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with the article’s theoretical expectations, the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty among political actors. The present analysis helps to resolve the contradictory findings in the literature.

Constraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000

Becher, M. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

This article investigates how veto players affect the reform of labor market policies in advanced industrial democracies. Complementing Tsebelis’s veto player model with the assumption of ministerial agenda control within the cabinet, the argument is that the constitutional and partisan distribution of veto power affects the capability of ministers to change the status quo in line with their partisan goals. This claim is tested with panel data on unemployment insurance entitlements and employment protection legislation in 20 OECD countries between 1973 and 2000. The central finding is that veto players constrain the power of ministers, cabinet ministers and prime ministers alike, to pursue their partisan interests. The partisanship of ministers shapes reforms only if the ideological distance between veto players is relatively small, and the influence of ministerial partisanship declines as ideological distance increases.

Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR

Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

Based on recent work that suggests that voters in proportional representation (PR) systems have incentives to cast strategic votes, the authors hypothesize that levels of strategic voting are similar in both first-past-the-post (FPTP) and PR systems. Comparing vote intentions in majoritarian elections in the United States, Mexico, Britain, and Israel to PR elections in Israel and the Netherlands, the authors find that a substantial proportion of the voters desert their most preferred candidate or party and that patterns of strategic voting across FPTP and PR bear striking similarities. In every election, smaller parties tend to lose votes to major parties. Because there tend to be more small parties in PR systems, tactical voting is actually more common under PR than under FPTP. The findings suggest that whatever the electoral system, voters focus on the policy consequences of their behavior and which parties are likely to influence policy outcomes following the election.

"No Irish Need Apply"? Veto Players and Legislative Productivity in the Republic of Ireland, 1949-2000

Conley, R. S., Bekafigo, M. A. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

This analysis fills an important lacuna in comparative legislative studies by testing the veto players theory against a newly constructed data set of significant domestic policy legislation passed in the Republic of Ireland between 1949 and 2000. Distinguishing between single-party majority, coalition, and minority governments, the analysis places into sharp relief the ways in which the unique context of Irish political parties and institutional dynamics conflict with the basic tenets of the veto players framework. The results underscore the contextual constraints on applicability of the theory.

Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behavior in Mexico

Perez-Armendariz, C., Crow, D. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

International migrants are agents of democratic diffusion. They spread attitudes and behaviors absorbed in democratic host countries to their less democratic home countries by way of three processes: (a) migrant returns, (b) cross-border communication between migrants still abroad and their friends and family back home, and (c) migrant information networks in high-volume migration-producing communities. Marshaling data from an original June 2006 national survey in Mexico, the authors show that through one or another of these processes, migration alters the political participation and behavior of Mexicans living in Mexico.

Book Review: Brooks, S. M. (2009). Social Protection and the Market in Latin America. The Transformation of Social Security Institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Pribble, J. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

Book Review: Carey, J. M. (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Carroll, R. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

Book Review: Menz, G. (2009). The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Ellermann, A. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules

Bingham Powell, G. — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 13:38:02 PDT

Focusing on the left-right scale as a summary measure of citizens’ and representatives’ preferences, a growing body of literature has used a variety of approaches and data in measuring positions of citizens and representatives. The most recent studies, contrary to previous ones, show no significant difference between ideological congruence in single member district (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems. This article examines the major alternative measurement approaches and data sets, finding that recent results are due to differences in time period, not differences in measurement approach. The associations between election rules and ideological congruence are relatively robust to various measurement approaches, as are estimations of the causal processes shaping ideological congruence. The association between election rules and congruence has declined in the past decade, as shown by all three major approaches, due primarily to convergence toward the median of plurality parties in the SMD elections.

Time Bomb?: The Dynamic Effect of News and Symbols on the Political Identity of European Citizens

Bruter, M. — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 13:38:02 PDT

Based on a three-wave, six-country comparative panel study experiment with 1,197 participants, this article shows how in the long term, political institutions and the media can affect the European identity of citizens. It shows not only that exposure to good or bad news on Europe and to symbols of the European Union has an effect on European identity but also that news works as a powerful time bomb. It suggests that whereas increasingly cynical European citizens first resist perceived attempts of political manipulation, the effect of news ultimately kicks in and so influences citizens’ European identity with remarkable efficiency in the long term. The 2.5-year study demonstrates this time bomb effect of news, as well as an immediate but growing effect of political symbols on citizens’ identity.

Crafting Trust: The Role of Political Institutions in a Comparative Perspective

Freitag, M., Buhlmann, M. — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 13:38:02 PDT

In this article, the authors evaluate the origins of generalized trust. In addition to examining individual-level determinants, the analytic focus is on the political-institutional context. In contrast to most of the analyses to date, the authors conduct hierarchical analyses of the World Values Surveys (1995-1997 and 1999-2001) to simultaneously test for differences among respondents in 58 countries and for variations in levels of trust between countries with different institutional configurations. In addition, the authors extend the institutional theory of trust by introducing the power-sharing quality of institutions—a rather neglected institutional dimension hitherto. With regard to the most important contextual factors, the authors find that countries whose authorities are seen as incorruptible, whose institutions of the welfare state reduce income disparities, and whose political interests are represented in a manner proportional to their weight have citizens who are more likely to place trust in one another.

Technology and the Evolution of the Regulatory State

Whitford, A. B., Tucker, J. A. — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 13:38:02 PDT

Modern states increasingly rely on two means of regulating markets: public regulation (by the government) and private self-regulation (by the firms themselves). This study assesses the evolution of the state toward co-regulation by examining, across countries, the incidence of a prominent type of self-regulation: the environmental protection standard ISO 14001. It focuses on technological capabilities as a precursor to the widespread adoption of ISO 14001. Just as technological progress helps to explain differences in economic growth, markets with greater technological attainment (specifically, general purpose technologies) arguably have greater firm-level adoption of self-regulation practices. According to panel data, ISO 14001 is more widespread in countries with greater technological capabilities, but there are diminishing returns to the impact of technology. As such, limited technological attainment remains a key factor that constrains economic growth and limits not only the capacity of the market to regulate itself but so, too, the evolution of the state toward a system of co-regulation.

Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building

Dryzek, J. S. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:42:08 PDT

Effective deliberation is central to democracy and so should enter any definition of democratization. However, the deliberative aspect now ubiquitous in the theory, practice, and promotion of democracy is generally missing in comparative studies of democratization. Deliberation capacity can be distributed in variable ways in the deliberative systems of states and other polities. A framework is described for locating and analyzing the contributions of its components and so evaluating the degree to which a polity’s deliberative system is authentic, inclusive, and consequential. An emphasis on deliberation reveals important determinants of democratic transition and consolidation, thereby providing substantial explanatory as well as evaluative and normative purchase.

Electoral Protests and Democratization Beyond the Color Revolutions

Kalandadze, K., Orenstein, M. A. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:42:08 PDT

The sight of thousands of people demonstrating for clean elections and an end to corrupt postcommunist regimes led many observers to declare that the so-called color revolutions had finally brought democracy to Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. But how successful have these electoral revolutions actually been? The authors analyze all cases of electoral revolutions worldwide since 1991, distinguishing between failed and successful electoral revolutions, to conclude that even successful electoral revolutions have shown insignificant or no democratic progress in their wake. Electoral revolutions are ineffective at advancing democratization because they place too great an emphasis on elections themselves and do not address other fundamental obstacles to democratization in hybrid and authoritarian regimes. International influences have proven more successful in promoting democratization in countries of postcommunist Europe.

The Politicized Participant: Ideology and Political Action in 20 Democracies

van der Meer, T. W. G., van Deth, J. W., Scheepers, P. L. H. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:42:08 PDT

Modern liberal democracies demand high and equal levels of political action. Unequal levels of political action between ideological groups may ultimately lead to biased policy. But to what extent do citizens’ ideological preferences affect their likelihood to participate politically? And does the institutional environment moderate this relationship? From rivaling theories, the authors construct hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideological preferences and participation and those regarding the moderating effect of state institutions. They test them for six modes of political action—voting, contacting, campaigning, cooperating, persuading, and protesting—through multilevel analyses of 27 elections in 20 Western democracies. First, they find that citizens’ ideological preferences are an important determinant political action. Second, they find that majoritarianism outperforms consensualism: In majoritarian systems, political action is more widespread and not less equal across the crucial factor of ideological preferences. The field should therefore reconsider Lijphart’s conclusions about the superiority of consensualism.

Book Reviews: Lyne, M. M. (2008). The Voter's Dilemma and Democratic Accountability: Explaining the Democracy-Development Paradox. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press

Hiroi, T. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:42:08 PDT

Book Reviews: Bednar, J. (2009). The Robust Federation: Principles of Design. New York: Cambridge University Press

Sadanandan, A. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:42:08 PDT

Book Reviews: Schain, M. A. (2008). The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States: A Comparative Study. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Bowyer, B. T. — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:42:08 PDT

Tomorrow's Leaders?: Understanding the Involvement of Young Party Members in Six European Democracies

Bruter, M., Harrison, S. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT

Using a mass survey of young members of 15 parties in six European democracies, this article explores their motivations, perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. In a context of general disenchantment with politics and febrile participation, particularly among young citizens, this article explains why a large number of youngsters still decide to get involved in one of the most traditional forms of activism: party membership. The study uses a comparative survey of 2,919 young party members ages 18 to 25 and shows that they fit into three categories: moral-, social-, and professional-minded. Young party members significantly differ in terms of their perceptions, preferences, behavior, and desired future involvement. The findings shed unprecedented light on the hearts and minds of tomorrow’s political leaders, a subgroup of professional-minded young party members who distinguish themselves from the majority of ideologically driven, moral-minded activists and some less motivated, disciplined, and reliable social-minded members.

Speak Clearly and Carry a Big Stock of Dollar Reserves: Sovereign Risk, Ideology, and Presidential Elections in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela

Spanakos, A. P., Renno, L. R. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT

Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic with the election of a left-wing presidential candidate. The latter seems to be what happened in Brazil in the 2002 presidential elections. However, quantitative analysis of perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Argentine, Brazilian, Mexican, and Venezuelan presidential elections from 1994 until 2007 shows no real evidence of a link between partisanship and perceptions of risk, even if the left-right divide is further broken down into left, center-left, center-right, right. Instead, international and domestic economic fundamentals have a stronger influence on risk evaluations. Qualitative analysis of the individual presidential elections shows the importance of policy uncertainty in explaining why certain electoral periods seemed more critical than others and how bondholders select between multiple equilibria. This research helps shift political analysis away from partisanship and more in the direction of policies and articulation.

Voter Turnout in Presidential Democracies

Dettrey, B. J., Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT

Numerous studies indicate that political institutions play an important role in explaining variation in voter turnout across countries. The nuances of institutions unique to presidential elections have been largely overlooked, however, despite the different incentives they offer for voters to participate in elections. This article examines the effect that four presidential institutions had on voter turnout in presidential elections between 1974 and 2004—the timing of elections (whether concurrent or nonconcurrent), the power of the presidency, presidential electoral rules (plurality or majority runoff), and reelection rules. To isolate the effect of presidential institutions, this study controls for other likely influences on turnout, including the economic environment and the wider political context. It finds that (a) runoff elections dampen turnout whereas incumbency spurs it and (b) more powerful presidencies and elections, when held concurrently with legislative elections, have little effect on voter participation.

Patronage and Political Stability in Africa

Arriola, L. R. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader’s patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader’s patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader’s being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.

Book Review: Pop-Eleches, G. (2009). From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Lee, A. S. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT

Book Review: Hale, H. E. (2008). The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Radnitz, S. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT

Book Review: Sobek, D. (2009). The Causes of War. Cambridge, UK: Polity

Aleprete, M. E. — Mon, 31 Aug 2009 11:56:58 PDT