Comparative Political Studies current issue

Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

Golder, S. N. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences, surprisingly little is known about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions. In this article, the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with the article’s theoretical expectations, the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty among political actors. The present analysis helps to resolve the contradictory findings in the literature.

Constraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000

Becher, M. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

This article investigates how veto players affect the reform of labor market policies in advanced industrial democracies. Complementing Tsebelis’s veto player model with the assumption of ministerial agenda control within the cabinet, the argument is that the constitutional and partisan distribution of veto power affects the capability of ministers to change the status quo in line with their partisan goals. This claim is tested with panel data on unemployment insurance entitlements and employment protection legislation in 20 OECD countries between 1973 and 2000. The central finding is that veto players constrain the power of ministers, cabinet ministers and prime ministers alike, to pursue their partisan interests. The partisanship of ministers shapes reforms only if the ideological distance between veto players is relatively small, and the influence of ministerial partisanship declines as ideological distance increases.

Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR

Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

Based on recent work that suggests that voters in proportional representation (PR) systems have incentives to cast strategic votes, the authors hypothesize that levels of strategic voting are similar in both first-past-the-post (FPTP) and PR systems. Comparing vote intentions in majoritarian elections in the United States, Mexico, Britain, and Israel to PR elections in Israel and the Netherlands, the authors find that a substantial proportion of the voters desert their most preferred candidate or party and that patterns of strategic voting across FPTP and PR bear striking similarities. In every election, smaller parties tend to lose votes to major parties. Because there tend to be more small parties in PR systems, tactical voting is actually more common under PR than under FPTP. The findings suggest that whatever the electoral system, voters focus on the policy consequences of their behavior and which parties are likely to influence policy outcomes following the election.

"No Irish Need Apply"? Veto Players and Legislative Productivity in the Republic of Ireland, 1949-2000

Conley, R. S., Bekafigo, M. A. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

This analysis fills an important lacuna in comparative legislative studies by testing the veto players theory against a newly constructed data set of significant domestic policy legislation passed in the Republic of Ireland between 1949 and 2000. Distinguishing between single-party majority, coalition, and minority governments, the analysis places into sharp relief the ways in which the unique context of Irish political parties and institutional dynamics conflict with the basic tenets of the veto players framework. The results underscore the contextual constraints on applicability of the theory.

Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behavior in Mexico

Perez-Armendariz, C., Crow, D. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

International migrants are agents of democratic diffusion. They spread attitudes and behaviors absorbed in democratic host countries to their less democratic home countries by way of three processes: (a) migrant returns, (b) cross-border communication between migrants still abroad and their friends and family back home, and (c) migrant information networks in high-volume migration-producing communities. Marshaling data from an original June 2006 national survey in Mexico, the authors show that through one or another of these processes, migration alters the political participation and behavior of Mexicans living in Mexico.

Book Review: Brooks, S. M. (2009). Social Protection and the Market in Latin America. The Transformation of Social Security Institutions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Pribble, J. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

Book Review: Carey, J. M. (2009). Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Carroll, R. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST

Book Review: Menz, G. (2009). The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Ellermann, A. — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 11:33:00 PST