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Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia

Emory University

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: thomas.remington{at}emory.edu.

	Abstract

This article analyzes the formation of a stable dominant party in an authoritarian regime as a commitment problem between two sides: the ruler and other elites. After defining a dominant party regime and outlining the costs and benefits that such a regime entails for each side, the authors examine the efforts made in Russia to establish United Russia as a dominant party and argue that the Kremlin and regional elites have overcome their commitment problem through mutual investment in the United Russia party. In contrast to previous party-of-power projects, United Russia represents an equilibrium arrangement between the federal center and other political and economic elite actors.

First published on December 9, 2008, doi:10.1177/0010414008327426

Comparative Political Studies 2009;42:501.

A more recent version of this article appeared on April 1, 2009


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