When Do Votes Count? Regime Type, Electoral Conduct, and Political Competition in Africa
Harris Mylonas*
and
Nasos Roussias
Yale University
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: mylonas{at}yale.edu.
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Abstract |
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The effects of electoral systems have been tested recently in Africa, raising several questions: Are the systematic effects of electoral rules the same across regime types? Does the conduct of elections affect the process of strategic coordination between voters and parties? The literature to date has not considered these issues and also analyzes elections in settings where a crucial set of its assumptions are clearly violated. The authors argue that the mechanism of strategic coordination only operates in democracies that hold free and fair elections, and they exhibit the ways it is violated outside of this domain. They compile a new data set on sub-Saharan African elections and show that the interaction of electoral rules and ethnopolitical cleavages predicts the number of parties only in democratic settings, failing to produce substantive effects in nondemocratic ones.
