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Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behavior

Washington University in St. Louis

It has been argued that inclusive and decentralized selection procedures create greater incentives for parliamentarians to enhance their personal reputations. However, while the observable implications of this theory are at the level of individual members, the empirical data often brought to bear on this question to date have been collected at an aggregate level—the partisan bloc or legislative term. Despite some previously positive aggregate results, the author finds no discernible support for the connection between candidate selection procedures and vote-seeking behavior in Israel at the individual parliamentarian level. The author suggests an alternative theory—based on the stage of the legislative career—that explains both individual-level behavior and the aggregate-level trend.

Key Words: candidate selection • legislative behavior • Israeli politics

This version was published on July 1, 2009

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 7, 945-970 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414008330600


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