Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Comparative Political Studies
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
0010414008327427v1
42/4/527    most recent
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Selb, P.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

A Deeper Look at the Proportionality—Turnout Nexus

Peter Selb

University of Konstanz, Germany

Evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation (PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming. Yet previous research has largely failed to explain why. One line of argument maintains that higher turnout under PR is a by-product of larger party systems. However, a larger number of parties has been demonstrated to depress turnout. Alternatively, it is argued that majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce safe seats and that voters have little incentive to turn out there. Thus, uneven turnout over electoral districts due to variable intensities of local competition is made responsible for the lower overall turnout. Empirical evidence on this conjecture is scant. This article scrutinizes the relationship between electoral rules, competition, and turnout with district-level data from 31 national elections. Results from a heteroscedastic model indicate that lower net turnout in majoritarian systems is indeed a consequence of uneven turnout over districts due to variable levels of local competitiveness.

Key Words: turnout • electoral systems • electoral competition • proportionality • electoral districts

This version was published on April 1, 2009

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, 527-548 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414008327427
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?