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On the Duration of Political Power in Africa

The Role of Oil Rents

Université d'Auvergne, France

It is often underlined that African oil-producing countries are politically unstable as a result of the role that this resource can play in political incentives. Based on data documenting the duration in office of heads of state of 26 African countries (North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa), this study reveals a surprising twist on the conventional wisdom: The purported instability of African oil-producing countries does not appear to extend to the executive branch of the state. Conversely, using survival analysis, this research suggests a positive link between oil rents and the duration in office of African leaders. Findings also reveal that other mineral rents do not exhibit the same stabilizing effect. The author's interpretation of these results is grounded in an analysis of the practicalities of oil investment and the strategic aspect of oil.

Key Words: political power • oil rents • instability • party dominance • Africa

This version was published on March 1, 2009

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, 416-436 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414008325575


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