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Comparative Political Studies
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Ideas in Two-Level Games

The EC—United States Dispute Over Agriculture in the GATT Uruguay Round

Carsten Daugbjerg

University of Aarhus, Denmark

In 1992, the United States and the European Community (EC) reached an agreement on the Uruguay Round Agreement of Agriculture (URAA). A comparison of the EC's and the United States's initial agricultural proposals with the final agreement shows that the specific commitments agreed to reduce agricultural support and protection went a long way to accommodate EC agricultural interests. However, the United States had a decisive say on the paradigm underpinning the agreement. This outcome raises questions on the role of ideas in trade negotiations characterized by two-level games. The article shows that there was an overt ideational conflict between the United States and the EC and that the URAA was a trade-off between U.S. concessions on specific commitments to reduce agricultural protection and support and EC concessions on the ideational underpinning of the agreement. Thus, the EC was unable to convert its relatively smaller win set into full-scale bargaining power to influence both layers of the agreement.

Key Words: ideas • institutions • two-level games • trade policy • agriculture • GATT

This version was published on September 1, 2008

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 9, 1266-1289 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414007302341
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