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Comparative Political Studies
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Unstable Politics

Fiscal Space and Electoral Volatility in the Indian States

Irfan Nooruddin

The Ohio State University, Columbus

Pradeep Chhibber

University of California, Berkeley

What explains variations in electoral volatility? The authors argue that fiscal space—availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs—possessed by governments can explain the level of electoral volatility. Where governments have fiscal space, citizens reward incumbent parties with their continued support. But when fiscal space is constrained, the incumbent government's ability to provide state resources is drastically reduced. Citizens are therefore less likely to reward the party at the polls and are available to opposition politicians and alternative appeals. Vote-switching ensues, and the incumbent government is voted out of the office. The authors test this argument and others in the existing literature on electoral returns from state assembly elections across 15 major Indian states from 1967 to 2004. The results support the argument that fiscal space influences electoral volatility.

Key Words: fiscal space • electoral volatility • party politics • India

This version was published on August 1, 2008

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 8, 1069-1091 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414007309202
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