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Competitive Assimilation or Strategic Nonassimilation?

The Political Economy of School Choice in Latvia

Southern Illinois University

This article tests the competitive assimilation and strategic nonassimilation models, using district-level data from Latvia. Unlike the coordination dynamic of the competitive assimilation game, the strategic nonassimilation game highlights the strategic interaction between Russian and Latvian players. Russian parents do not look to other Russian parents when deciding to send their children to Latvian schools; rather, they look to Latvian children. They anticipate whether their children will be accepted or excluded in the Latvian classroom. My chief empirical finding is a significant interactive relationship between the size of Russian population and the strength of Latvian nationalism. In regions with small Russian populations, Latvian nationalism fuels assimilation. In regions with large Russian populations, Latvian nationalism propels nonassimilation.

Key Words: assimilation • ethnicity • nationalism • ethnic politics • rational choice • Latvia

This version was published on July 1, 2008

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 7, 947-970 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414007300918


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