This Article Full Text (PDF) All Versions of this Article: 0010414007313118v1 41/4-5/638    most recent References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Grzymala-Busse, A. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Beyond Clientelism

Incumbent State Capture and State Formation

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

In choosing strategies of state capture (the extraction of private benefits by incumbent officeholders from the state), rulers choose whether to share rents with popular constituencies and whether to tolerate competition. These choices are conditioned by existing organizational endowments, the costs of buying support, and the trade-off between the cost and probability of exit from office. In turn, both rent distribution and competition result in distinct configurations of state capture: clientelism, predation, fusion, exploitation, and the formation of specific state institutions and capacities.

Key Words: state capture strategies • rent distribution • competition

This version was published on April 1, 2008

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4-5, 638-673 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414007313118


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?