This Article Full Text (PDF) All Versions of this Article: 0010414007300694v1 41/3/362    most recent References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Jhee, B.-K. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Economic Origins of Electoral Support for Authoritarian Successors

A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting in New Democracies

Korea University, Seoul

This study explores how economic performance prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers in new democracies. It investigates 70 founding election outcomes, finding that successful economic performance under an authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors. It also finds that the past economic performance of authoritarian rulers decreases the likelihood of government alternation to democratic oppositions. Interim governments that initiate democratic transition, however, are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic conditions during transition periods. This study concludes that electorates are not myopic and that economic voting is not a knee-jerk reaction to short-term economic performance in new democracies.

Key Words: democratization • economic voting • authoritarian regime • interim government • new democracies

This version was published on March 1, 2008

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, 362-388 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414007300694


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?