This Article Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free All Versions of this Article: 0010414006288979v1 40/10/1155    most recent References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Tsebelis, G. Articles by Rizova, T. P. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries

University of California, Los Angeles

Tatiana P. Rizova

University of California, Los Angeles

Nine out of 27 presidents in the former communist world have the power to amend vetoed legislation. These presidential powers in the former Soviet Bloc have not been given adequate attention in the comparative politics literature. The authors analyze veto procedures in the excommunist region (27 countries) and argue that amendatory veto power enhances presidential powers in legislative decision making. The findings are particularly important in light of the fact that one of the goals of constitutional design in the former communist world was to curtail rather than boost presidential authority.

Key Words: conditional agenda setting • post-communist countries • veto players • presidential and semipresidential regimes

This version was published on October 1, 2007

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 10, 1155-1182 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414006288979


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?