Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Comparative Political Studies
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Web of Science (2)
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Grzymala-Busse, A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions

Postcommunist Party Competition and State Oversight

Anna Grzymala-Busse

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Why do some new democratic political politicians constrain themselves and reduce their discretion to extract resources from the state and the processes of privatization? Postcommunist democracies show surprising variation in the adoption of formal institutions of monitoring and oversight. These institutions regulate markets, empower citizen oversight, and police the use and distribution of state assets. These have arisen rapidly in some countries and with considerable delays in others. Accounts that link institutional creation to European Union imposition, initial bargaining, and parliamentary divisions do not fully explain the variation. Instead, in the nine consolidated democracies and free markets examined here, robust political competition triggered mechanisms of anticipatory institution building and moderation of government behavior.

Key Words: institutional choice • state oversight • discretion • postcommunist • party competition

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, 271-300 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414005284216
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 East European Politics and SocietiesHome page
A. Gwiazda
Party Patronage in Poland: The Democratic Left Alliance and Law and Justice Compared
East European Politics and Societies, November 1, 2008; 22(4): 802 - 827.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 European Union PoliticsHome page
D. Toshkov
Embracing European Law: Compliance with EU Directives in Central and Eastern Europe
European Union Politics, September 1, 2008; 9(3): 379 - 402.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Party PoliticsHome page
M. A. Vachudova
Centre--Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe
Party Politics, July 1, 2008; 14(4): 387 - 405.
[Abstract] [PDF]