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Comparative Political Studies
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Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters?

Economic Hardship, Political Institutions, and Voting Behavior in Latin America

Allyson Lucinda Benton

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.

This article examines recent trends in Latin American voting behavior and casts them in terms of sincere (economic) and strategic (electoral) concerns. It argues that thanks to years of economic adversity, Latin Americans have developed long, sophisticated economic memories. Although this has resulted in rising frustration with democratic government, according to recent opinion polls, it has not always led voters to punish all parties responsible for hardship at election time. A panel study of the region’s presidential systems demonstrates that citizens punish incumbents by voting for established nonincumbents when electoral laws reduce opportunities available to small parties in the systems, even if nonincumbents have also been blamed for hard economic times. More permissive electoral systems, in contrast, encourage citizens to reject all parties responsible for economic decline. The analysis demonstrates how economic and electoral concerns interact to affect voting behavior, political accountability, and public opinion in Latin America.

Key Words: economic voting • strategic voting • economic reform • Latin America

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, 417-442 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414004273856
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