This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in ISI Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Pereira, C. Articles by Mueller, B. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

The Cost of Governing

Strategic Behavior of the President and Legislators in Brazil’s Budgetary Process

Universidade de São Paulo

Bernardo Mueller

Universidade de Brasília

Several characteristics of a political system have been identified as increasing the cost of governing, such as presidentialism, federalism, an open list with proportional representation, a multiparty system, and coalition governments. Although Brazil suffers from all of these "pathologies," the authors argue that other characteristics of the Brazilian system have the opposite effect and allow high levels of governability at low cost. In particular, the authors examine the role of legislators’ amendments to the budget, which provide the executive a low-cost means of obtaining support. The authors provide evidence that the Brazilian president routinely uses his or her powers to reward and punish legislators for supporting or opposing his or her interests in Congress. Although legislators have a limited role in the budgetary process, that role can have important electoral consequences for their political careers.

Key Words: Brazilian budget • executive dominance • Congress • pork barrel politics • cost of governing

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?