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Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, No. 10, 1184-1212 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414004269833

Interorganizational Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision Making

Early Agreements Under Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament and Council

Henry Farrell

George Washington University

Adrienne HÉRitier

European University Institute

The authors argue that closer attention should be paid to the interorganizational rules of decision making and their implications for intraorganizational processes. They claim that exogenous changes in macro-institutional rules, which result in a move from formal and sequential to informal and simultaneous interaction between collective actors, will lead to changes in individual actors’ respective influence over outcomes within organizations. Certain individuals controlling information flows between organizations will see an increase in their power over legislative outcomes. This begs the question of how organizations will respond to these shifts in the power balance among the individual actors that constitute them. The authors argue that collective actors that centralize coordination over dealings with external actors will respond effectively through internal rule change. In contrast, collective actors with multiple, ill-coordinated links to other organizations will find it difficult to change internal rules. The authors empirically explore the general argument by analyzing the relationship between the Council and the European Parliament in the process of codecision and its implications for intraorganizational processes.

Key Words: European Parliament • intraorganizational bargaining • institutions


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