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Comparative Political Studies
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Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy

Kathleen O'Neill

Cornell University

The decentralization of government is one of the most significant trends in politics worldwide. Variation in the timing of reform across countries only vaguely relates to the genesis of an international consensus pushed by big lenders and development banks or the reemergence of democracy in decentralizing countries. Moreover, these reforms were enacted from the top, which appears to contradict one of political science's central tenets: that politicians seek to maximize (or at least maintain) control over political and fiscal resources. This article develops a theory linking the adoption of decentralization to the electoral concerns of political parties: Decentralization represents a desirable strategy for parties whose support at subnational levels appears more secure than their prospects in national elections. The author tests this argument using data from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

Key Words: decentralization • Latin America • reform • political parties • elections • Andes

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 9, 1068-1091 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414003257098
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