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Rulers and Rules

Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation

Yale University

AMANEY AHMAD JAMAL

University of Michigan

Previous efforts to understand the creation of political institutions in newly democratizing states have largely ignored the importance of regime types in explaining institutional development. However, this article argues that the type of authoritarian regime in place at the onset of liberalization significantly influences the creation of electoral rules. Incumbent elites in formerly single-party regimes prefer electoral laws that concentrate legislative power in the hands of the dominant party, whereas monarchs prefer systems that allow representation to a wide range of parties. Consequently, the establishment of electoral institutions in monarchies and one-party states should differ. Examining the Middle East, this article finds that a distinct pattern of electoral institutions in monarchies and one-party states does indeed exist. Furthermore, these electoral institutions promote significant differences in legislative representation.

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 337-366 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414002035003004


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