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A Politics of Institutional Choice

Post-Communist Presidencies

The Ohio State University

This work uses incomplete contracting theory to account for variation in the specific and residual powers of post-Communist presidencies. It uses evidence from 24 post-Communist countries to test theories of institutional choice that link presidential powers to economic reform, institutional legacies, party systems, and social cleavages. It argues that two factors can account for variation in presidential powers: the bargaining power of the electoral favorite and the degree of uncertainty over the electoral outcome. It tests this model in greater detail against four cases: Russia, 1991; Estonia, 1992; Russia, 1993; Belarus, 1994. Three insights flow from these cases. First, political institutions can be analyzed as the by-products of power-seeking politicians making choices under varying degrees of uncertainty. Second, despite the great uncertainty of the transition, actors understand their interests and strategies. Third, high uncertainty compels political actors to hedge their bets when designing political institutions.

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 30, No. 5, 523-552 (1997)
DOI: 10.1177/0010414097030005001


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