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In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts

¹ University of Kentucky
² Yale University

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: susan.hyde{at}yale.edu.

	Abstract

International efforts to promote democracy can have unanticipated effects. International election observation is perceived to increase domestic confidence in the electoral process and reduce fraud. Conversely, election boycotts are perceived to be more likely as electoral fairness decreases. The authors document a puzzling relationship between monitored elections and opposition party boycotts: Observers are associated with an increased boycott probability. They argue that international benefits for democratic elections give electoral autocrats the incentive to invite international observers and manipulate elections to minimize international criticism. This increase in "strategic manipulation" has led to changed incentives for opposition political parties, which have the most to lose from a manipulated but internationally certified election. Consequently, international monitors increase boycott probability. The authors support this explanation with an original data set of elections, boycotts, and international observers (1990 to 2002).

First published on October 27, 2008, doi:10.1177/0010414008325571

Comparative Political Studies 2009;42:392.

A more recent version of this article appeared on March 1, 2009


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